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ABSTRACT
Electrical distribution systems are the last stage of electricity delivery, bridging the gap
between transmission networks and the customer. Compared to transmission systems,
there has been comparatively little analysis performed on distribution infrastructure. We
first establish a minimum load shed optimal switching model. The model seeks to ensure
all electricity demand is met for a given distribution system by minimizing the amount of
load not met. This is accomplished by closing and opening switches within the network,
subject to various electrical physics constraints. We initially test our model against a simple
toy network to verify proper operation before expanding to increasingly complex networks.
We culminate with testing against a standardized test circuit.
The model runs in an open-source programming language on a consumer-grade 
lap-top, reading in data from common formats with solvers readily familiar to the 
optimization community.
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Executive Summary
Of the 16 critical infrastructure sectors, electric power is identified as being significantly
important because it enables the operation of the other sectors. Within the realm of electric
power, electrical distribution systems consist of the substations, transformers, and lines that
bridge the gap between transmission systems, which originate at power plants such as coal
or nuclear, and the end-user. Distribution systems are most readily characterized as the
power poles and lines running between homes, commercial businesses, and neighboring
municipalities.
Working in concert with our associates at Los Alamos National Labs (LANL) and under
the Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC) - NPS research program, we build a linearized
optimization model in the Python programming language, implementing the mathematical
program in the Pyomo environment. The original formulation was provided by our LANL
associates and expanded upon during model development. At its core, the model delivers
real and reactive power from an originating substation(s) to loads throughout the network,
adhering to various electrical engineering physics constraints.
These constraints include flow balance, balance between the power transmission for phases
within a single line, adhering to the thermal limits of lines, line losses due to resistance and
reactance, maintaining nominal system operating voltage, and various topology constraints.
The entire model is driven by an objective function seeking to minimize the load shed
throughout the network.
Testing and analysis is initially performed on a test circuit provided by our associates at
LANL. The circuit is simple enough that basic operation can be checked by hand calculation
to verify model behavior. We then specifically examine behavior of the topology constraints
against another test circuit we designed. We observe the model performing proper operation
of switches within the network to preclude cycle formation while still minimizing load shed.
Our testing culminates with application of an Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engi-
neers (IEEE) standardized test circuit. The test circuit possesses more robust and dynamic
electrical characteristics, specifically imbalanced loading and phase variations. Zero load
shed is expected with the test circuit and we observe none with our model. The downstream
xv
goal of our work here is to perform analysis on real-world distribution systems when they
are subject to various disruptions. As an intermediate step toward that goal we duplicate
the IEEE network into “a” and “b” sides, connecting them with a single line containing a
switch. We proceed to remove the substation from the “b” side and observe the resulting
behavior as the remaining “a” substation attempts to power the entire system.
We conclude with recommendations for continued work and analysis. Specifically, our
model can be folded into attacker-defender analyses to inform researchers on vulnerabilities
within a given distribution system. Furthermore, testing of real-world systems by triggering
systematic failures of given components can yield insights to distribution system behavior
when under duress. Ourwork is unique due to its focus on distribution systems, its adherence
to electrical engineering mathematics, and results with guaranteed optimality.
xvi
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The U.S. government defines critical infrastructure as “systems and assets, whether physical
or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and
assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national
public health or safety, or any combination of those matters” (White House, 2013). Critical
infrastructure systems are those which deliver the energy to heat and cool our homes, the
water we drink, the communication systemswe enjoy, and the transportation systems that are
integral to the American way of life. Furthermore, these systems serve as the foundation for
the economy, security, and health of our nation (Department of Homeland Security, 2017).
Due to the significance of these systems, there is considerable interest in understanding,
modeling, and predicting of infrastructure system response to disruption. It is of paramount
interest at the presidential level that we “maintain secure, functioning, and resilient critical
infrastructure” (White House, 2013). Electric power, one of these critical infrastructure
systems, is the focus of this research.
1.1 The Importance of Electric Power
As defined by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), there are 16 critical infras-
tructure sectors (Department of Homeland Security, 2017). Of these, electric power is
particularly important because it provides an “enabling function” for the others in funda-
mental ways (White House, 2013).
The overall structure of electrical power infrastructure can be loosely categorized into
three main parts: generation, transmission, and distribution. Generation systems, such as
solar, hydro, wind, nuclear, or gas turbine power plants, produce electricity. Transmission
systems move electricity in bulk from the originating power plant to substations and are
most commonly recognized as the massive towers carrying heavy lines across rural stretches
of highway. The distribution system exists between the substation and end customer, most
readily characterized as the telephone poles abundant in any residential and commercial
area.
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Disruptions to the electric power system can be caused by a variety of sources. Foremost
among these are natural disasters such as hurricanes or earthquakes. For example, Hurricane
Sandy in 2012 caused power losses to over 8,000,000 homes across 17 states (Webley, 2012).
Other potential causes of electric power disruption are operator error (e.g., the Three Mile
Island incident; see Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2013) or the actions of an adversary
(e.g., the coordinated attacks on the Metcalf substation in 2013 near San Jose, CA; see
Smith, 2014). Consequences for these disruptions vary depending on the scope and scale of
the damage as well as the types of electricity infrastructure damaged. A car hitting a power
pole may interrupt power to a single home, but a worst-case solar event electromagnetic
pulse (EMP) would take an estimated four to ten years to repair and leave most of the United
States without power (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 2010).
Regardless of the cause, the consequences of a disruption have significant negative impli-
cations for our welfare, both in terms of loss of life as well as negative economic impacts
(Anderson and Bell, 2012; Rose et al., 1997). Generation facilities are frequently taken
online and offline to balance power supply and load demand, but unexpected failure of a
generation facility can cause problems (Knaus, 2017). Disruptions to transmission systems,
either from the loss of a high-voltage line or a substation, can impede the ability to move
bulk power and cause long-distance power outages (Cava, 2017). A disruption to a distri-
bution system causes downstream customers to potentially go without electricity, but these
effects are often local in nature.
There is a tactical need to understand the strengths and weaknesses of our own electric grid
as well as those of potential adversaries. Domestically, identifying weaknesses in our grid
informs our defense efforts so we can minimize the impact of adversarial action against
us, because as reporters, politicians, and utility operators know, disruptions are devastating
(Williams and Bennett, 2016). From an offensive perspective, we desire to know the effects
of targeting an enemy’s infrastructure to achieve our tactical objective, but we desire to
restrict the consequence to only what’s necessary to achieve victory. Militarily, the second
order effects of taking out an entire transmission system in an enemy territory might prove
too costly. Research has shown that in large scale power outages, ordinary civilians suffer
and death rates increase (Anderson and Bell, 2012). If we seek to confine power disruption
to as small an area as possible, attacking the transmission system is off the table. Hart et al.
(2014) provide a discussion of the tensions and tradeoffs for targeting infrastructure in a
2
military context.
Prior research and analysis efforts at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) have focused
primarily on the behavior and response of transmission systems. There are multiple re-
search papers and theses on the subject of transmission system modeling (e.g., Rose, 2007;
Salmerón et al., 2012). Comparatively, little effort has been applied to distribution systems.
The focus of this thesis is understanding how a distribution system will respond to the loss
of components (e.g., substations), and in particular the presence and size of outages. In
response to component failure, a distribution system will adjust its connectivity by opening
and closing switches to continue powering as much of the grid as possible. We capture this
behavior in a prescriptive decision Alternating Current Power Flow (ACPF) model which
changes flow by changing connectivity via switch position adjustments to minimize the
amount of load shed.
We implement the ACPF model in the Python programming language (Python Software
Foundation, 2017), primarily relying on the Pyomo optimization package (Hart et al., 2012,
2011). We verify model operation by application to a toy model and then expand to a real
data set from a large Northeastern utility provider.
1.2 Thesis Structure
Chapter 2 provides cursory overviews of the academic disciplines underpinning this work.
Additionally, we review the relevant literature and research pertaining to our analysis. In
Chapter 3 we introduce the ACPF model and demonstrate its application with a small series
of toy data sets. Chapter 4 describes our application of the model to a standardized test
circuit. We conclude inChapter 5 by summarizing our findings alongwith recommendations
for future research.
3




This chapter provides background information on the disciplines involved in this thesis as
well as pertinent previous research.
2.1 Technical Background Overview
Our work encapsulates two major academic domains: mathematical optimization and
Electrical Engineering (EE). While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to fully inform
the reader on both these subjects, we seek to provide a brief overview to aid reading our
work.
2.1.1 Mathematical Programming
Mathematical programming involves theory and methods for solving for extreme points,
either maxima or a minima, of functions on sets defined by linear and/or non-linear con-
straints. The primary objective function for which a maxima or a minima is being found,
commonly involves a maximum profit or lowest cost. The constraints are linear equality
and inequalities representing limitations imposed on the system, such as how much money
can be spent or the capacity limits of a path. For a thorough introduction to optimization
and mathematical programming, see the textbook Optimization in Operations Research
(Rardin, 2016).
2.1.2 Electrical Engineering
For a deeper understanding of EE as it applies to electric power systems we recommend the
work Elements of Power Systems (Sadhu and Das, 2015).
Electrical transmission and distribution systems are frequently 3-phase Alternating Current
(AC) systems. The three phases are conventionally a, b, or c and a given load or line in the
network can be any combination of the three phases. The supply and demand quantities
in the network are measured in watts, with transmission systems generally operating in
Megawatts (Mw) while distribution systems frequently are measured in Kilowatts (Kw).
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Generated electricity consists of real and reactive components. Real power produces kinetic 
work (e.g., motors spinning), while reactive power is the electromagnetic hindrance of 
electrical processes. Correspondingly, loads in the network consume real and/or reactive 
power. Individual power lines possess both resistance and reactance, qualities that hinder 
real and reactive power flow, respectively.
2.2 Previous Research
2.2.1 Attacker-Defender and Defender-Attacker-Defender Analysis
Attacker-Defender (AD) analysis is a two-part optimization problem. The attacker seeks to
maximize the minimum value the defender can obtain from the system post attack. There
are three key assumptions in AD modeling, “(1) the attacker’s and defender’s actions are
sequential, (2) the attacker has a perfectmodel of how the defender will (or should) optimally
operate the system, even after an attack, and (3) the attacker will manipulate that system to
his best advantage” (Brown et al., 2006).
Defender is a bit of a misnomer in an AD model. Nothing is being hardened or made
invulnerable to attack; in reality the defender is simply a system user who best operates post-
attack. However, it is possible to expand a two-level AD model into a three-level Defender-
Attacker-Defender (DAD) model, where the system is initially hardened to preclude or
mitigate the most damaging attack (Brown et al., 2006). Afterward and with knowledge of
the defensive action, the attacker performs a most damaging attack, and lastly the system
operator works to obtain best system performance.
Salmerón et al. (2004) applies attacker-defender optimization supported by a heuristic to
an electric power model. They account for a great deal of electrical physics considerations,
abstaining from the simplifications of a pure flow model. Their results demonstrate the
ability to identify the key components in a network that, if attacked, would be most crippling
to operation and simultaneously represent the greatest need for hardening and resiliency
efforts. Analysis is performed on Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Reliability Test System (RTS) 96.
Salmerón et al. (2005) introduce a Graphical User Interface (GUI) for electric power
infrastructure analysis, named Vulnerability of Electric Grids Analyzer (VEGA), which
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is supported by an optimal power flow linear program and an interdiction model based
on heuristic algorithms. The heuristic algorithm is used to “find the combination of
facilities (generating units, buses, transmission lines, transformers and/or substations)whose
destruction would cause the largest or nearly largest disruption in the system at a given
point in time, which in turn suggests the system components most in need of hardening”
(Salmerón et al., 2005). Tests and analysis are performed on two real world transmission
systems. Additionally, a time-series component is incorporated with acknowledgement of
peak loading time-frames being the most devastating windows of attack.
Salmerón and Wood (2009) extend prior work to formulate and solve DAD problems for
electrical transmission grids, identifying critical components sensitive to terrorist attack.
Applying a generalized version of Benders decomposition, Salmerón et al. (2009) identify a
set of components whose interdiction causes maximum economic loss to customers. Their
test problems “describe a regional power grid in the United States with approximately 5000
buses, 6000 lines, and 500 generators” (Salmerón et al., 2009).
Salmerón et al. (2011) perform DAD analysis on Vandenberg Air Force base and its sur-
rounding area. Their efforts identify the vulnerable components whose destruction would
be maximally disruptive to system operation and presume adversaries are aware of those
defensive preparations, in turn making maximally destructive attacks. Lastly, the system
is optimally operated post-attack. This focus on a Department of Defense (DOD) entity is
unique because the surrounding area benefits from excess generation capacity.
Further modeling efforts focus on the Guam Power Authority (GPA), identifying critical
sets of components whose destruction would most impede GPA’s ability to provide power
(Salmerón et al., 2012). Subsequently, these sets of components benefit the most from
hardening efforts.
2.2.2 Previous NPS Theses
Analysis on electric power systems using AD and DAD models has been driven and sup-
ported by many student theses.
Stathakos (2003) performs research contributing to the development of VEGA. Alvarez
(2004) demonstrates empirical speed ups to Benders decomposition on electric grid inter-
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diction problems, tested against IEEE RTS networks. Optimality gap reductions occurred
alongside speed improvements.
Carnal (2005) further improves on VEGA by inclusion of the Xpres-MP software package,
reducing run-time by 65% - 85%.
Schneider (2005) performs DAD analysis on the eastern interconnection transmission grid
and determine hardening levels necessary to reduce risk below acceptable levels. Jonart
(2008) does follow-on work, making algorithmic improvements, yielding results within 1%
of optimality.
Ang (2006) performs a Mixed-integer program (MIP) optimization of electric grid recovery
efforts after natural disaster or terrorist attack. Constraints include availability of repair
resources, penalties for unserved electricity demand, and repair time planning horizons.
Testing is performed on an IEEE 300 bus transmission network.
Rose (2007) develops a mathematical model to identify critical components to defend in an
electric grid, given limited resources. Using a pure-flow model for the electric grid, Rose
reduces solution times from previous efforts while simultaneously finding solutions that are
40% better.
2.2.3 Damage Anticipation Modeling on Electrical Systems
Guikema et al. (2010) use regression and data mining techniques to estimate required
repair time and replacement utility poles and transformers in the wake of electric power
infrastructure damage resulting from natural disaster, notably hurricanes. Their efforts
are predictive in nature and seek to best prepare responders for repairs after a disruption.
Ouyang and Dueñas-Osorio (2014) build a probabilistic model to determine economic,
social, technical, and organizational resilience to hurricane damage.
Maliszewski and Perrings (2012) use regression modeling to build spatial outage visual-
izations and identify geographic factors with strong correlation to minimal outage risks in
Phoenix’s electrical distribution system. They find a strong correlation of neighborhoods
near high priority customers such as hospitals experiencing shortened outages because of
“the quality of infrastructure provided and the priority given to restoring supply to those
users” (Maliszewski and Perrings, 2012). Proximity to vegetation was statistically signifi-
8
cant as well while other services, such as police and fire stations or schools, all which were
insignificant or negatively correlated.
A variety of natural disasters, notably the 2010 earthquakes in Haiti and Chile, the 2011
earthquake and tsunami in Japan, as well as multiple hurricanes, have served as the sources
of data for various resiliency modeling efforts. MacKenzie and Barker (2012) build a re-
gression model and mixed effects model to anticipate rates of recovery post-disruption and
anticipate a system’s resiliency. Using data from Hurricane Ike, Wei et al. (2013) develop a
“spatial-temporal non-stationary random process to model large-scale disruptions of power
distribution induced by severe weather.” Their stochastic approach yields resiliency esti-
mates for components and identifies dynamic neighborhoodswithin the network. Kwasinski
(2016) performs data analysis and regressionmodeling to inform future damage anticipation
efforts and design considerations for distribution systems.
2.2.4 Optimal Switching and RTS usage
Delgadillo et al. (2010) construct an optimization approach to defend a grid against terrorist 
attack by calculating the best operator response (e.g., switching) to disruption. Their 
work is a two-part optimization, first identifying the most damaging terrorist attack, 
measured in Mw not delivered, and then identify the optimal switch realignment in 
response to that attack.
Additionally, deAssis et al. (2015) consider optimization of switch allocation for distribution
systems. They use a distribution system and identify the ideal locations for switches under
various system design constraints. Specifically, their research minimizes the cost of switch
allocation, a system design consideration. They also minimize energy not supplied while
meeting various regulatory agency reliability requirements and system capacity necessities.
Their solutions are determined by “memetic algorithms, supported by well-established
genetic algorithm concepts and local search optimization procedures.”
The IEEE 118-bus and the RTS 96 test system are studied for optimal transmission system
switching with a mixed integer program (Hedman et al., 2009). Their model demonstrates
the test networks can be operated to meet N-1 secure standards while simultaneously
cutting costs. Another instance of RTS usage is the work of Alguacil et al. (2003) in their
transmission expansion planning optimization problem.
9




We develop an alternating current (AC) model for electrical distribution system that in-
tegrates switching and adherence to full 3-phase AC mathematics. Instead of suggesting
likelihoods of what could happen in a disaster or terrorist scenario, we model what will
happen for any disruption or series of disruptions.
3.1 Model Formulation
Our Alternating Current Power Flow (ACPF) model is built in collaboration with our
partners at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), notably Harsha Nagarajan and Arthur
Barnes, with significant sourcing from their previous work (e.g., Barnes et al., 2017;
Nagarajan et al., 2016).
The entirety of our ACPF model is presented in NPS format for a given Power Grid (PG).
Discussion of the objective function and constraints follows in section 3.1.2.
3.1.1 Mathematical Formulation
Sets and Indices
i ∈ N set of nodes (buses) in PG (alias j)
E ⊆ N ×N set of undirected edges (lines and transformers) in PG
NT ⊆ E set of edges without transformers in PG
S ⊆ NT set of edges with switches in PG
A ⊆ N ×N set of directed arcs (lines and transformers) in PG
(i, j) ∈ E ⇐⇒ (i, j) ∈ E ∧ ( j, i) ∈ E
P = {a, b, c} set of phases in PG
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k ∈ Pi ⊆ P set of phases on bus i which contains a load or a generator
Pi j ⊆ P set of phases on line (i, j) in PG
C set of cycles in PG
N(C) set of nodes in cycle C
E(C) set of edges in cycle C
Parameters [units]
λpi,k cost for shedding real power at bus i on phase k [$/watt]
λqi,k cost for shedding reactive power at bus i on phase k [$/watt]
Ti j,k thermal limit on edge (i, j) for phase k [Amps]
v li,k, v
u
i,k voltage lower and upper bounds at bus i for phase k [Kv]
i imaginary number constant
dpi,k + i dqi,k AC power demand at bus i on phase k [Kw and Kvar]
gpui,k + i gq
u
i,k existing AC power generation capacity at bus i on phase k [Kw and Kvar]
Ri j,k + i Xi j,k impedance of edge (i, j) on phase k in PG [Ω]
Zi j impedance of edge (i, j), defined as:
Z i j = Zi jei2π/3; Z i j = Zi je
−i2π/3,where, Z i j = Ri j + iX i j, Z i j = Ri j + iX i j [Ω]
Mi j Mi j = (1.05Vnomj )
2 − (0.95Vnomi )
2 ∀i j ∈ E [Volts2]
βi j allowed variation in flow between phases on edge (i, j) [0.15 for transformer
edges, 1.0 for all other edges]
Vnomi nominal voltage the system is operating at [Kv]
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Decision Variables [units, when appropriate]
vi,k voltage at bus i on phase k [Kv]
xi j determines if directed arc (i, j) carries power flow in PG [binary]
pi j,k real AC power flow on arc (i, j) [Kw]
qi j,k reactive AC power flow on arc (i, j) [Kvar]
lpi,k + i lqi,k AC power load that is shed at bus i on phase k





(λpi,k lpi,k + λqi,k lqi,k) (1)
s.t.
Power flow constraints






p ji,k ∀i ∈ A, k ∈ Pi (2a)






q ji,k ∀i ∈ A, k ∈ Pi (2b)
(1 − βi j)
(∑
k∈Pi j pi j,k
|Pi j |
)
≤ pi j,k ≤ (1 + βi j)
(∑
k∈Pi j pi j,k
|Pi j |
)
∀i j ∈ A, k ∈ Pi j (3a)
(1 − βi j)
(∑
k∈Pi j qi j,k
|Pi j |
)
≤ qi j,k ≤ (1 + βi j)
(∑
k∈Pi j qi j,k
|Pi j |
)
∀i j ∈ A, k ∈ Pi j (3b)
p2i j,k + q
2





2√3 ∀i j ∈ A, k ∈ Pi j (4)
pi j,k + qi j,k ≤ xi jTi j,kVnomi
√
6 ∀i j ∈ A, k ∈ Pi j (4a)
(v j,a)2 − (vi,a)2 + 2(Raai j pi j,a + X
aa
i j qi j,a + R
ab
i j pi j,b + X
ab
i j qi j,b + R
ac
i j pi j,c + X
ac
i j qi j,c)
≥ −Mi j(1 − xi j) ∀i j ∈ NT (5a)
(v j,b)2 − (vi,b)2 + 2(Rbbi j pi j,b + X
bb
i j qi j,b + R
bc
i j pi j,c + X
bc
i j qi j,c + R
ba
i j pi j,a + X
ba
i j qi j,a)
≥ −Mi j(1 − xi j) ∀i j ∈ NT (5b)
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(v j,c)2 − (vi,c)2 + 2(Rcci j pi j,c + X
cc
i j qi j,c + R
ca
i j pi j,a + X
ca
i j qi j,a + R
cb
i j pi j,b + X
cb
i j qi j,b)
≥ −Mi j(1 − xi j) ∀i j ∈ NT (5c)
(v j,a)2 − (vi,a)2 + 2(Raai j pi j,a + X
aa
i j qi j,a + R
ab
i j pi j,b + X
ab
i j qi j,b + R
ac
i j pi j,c + X
ac
i j qi j,c)
≤ Mi j(1 − xi j) ∀i j ∈ NT (5d)
(v j,b)2 − (vi,b)2 + 2(Rbbi j pi j,b + X
bb
i j qi j,b + R
bc
i j pi j,c + X
bc
i j qi j,c + R
ba
i j pi j,a + X
ba
i j qi j,a)
≤ Mi j(1 − xi j) ∀i j ∈ NT (5e)
(v j,c)2 − (vi,c)2 + 2(Rcci j pi j,c + X
cc
i j qi j,c + R
ca
i j pi j,a + X
ca
i j qi j,a + R
cb
i j pi j,b + X
cb
i j qi j,b)
≤ Mi j(1 − xi j) ∀i j ∈ NT (5f)
(0.95Vnomi )
2 ≤ v2i,k ≤ (1.05V
nom
i )
2 ∀i ∈ N, k ∈ Pi (6)
0 ≤ gpi,k ≤ gpui,k ∀i ∈ N, k ∈ Pi (7a)
gqi,k ≤ gqui,k ∀i ∈ N, k ∈ Pi (7b)
− gqi,k ≤ gqui,k ∀i ∈ N, k ∈ Pi (7c)
lpi,k ≤ dpi,k ∀i ∈ N, k ∈ Pi (8a)
lqi,k ≤ dqi,k ∀i ∈ N, k ∈ Pi (8b)
Topology constraints∑
i j∈E(C)
xi j ≤ |N(C)| − 1 ∀C (9)
xi j + x ji ≤ 1 ∀(i, j) ∈ E (10a)
xi j + x ji ≥ 1 ∀(i, j) ∈ E \ S (10b)
3.1.2 Model Discussion
The objective function (1) minimizes the cost associated with all real and reactive load 
shed due to the loss of generation capacity at bus i. The cost parameters, λpi,k and λqi,k 
(nominally set to 1) scale the total value of Kw and Kilovolt-ampere reactive (Kvar) shed 
by the model.
Constraints (2a) and (2b) maintain balance of flow throughout the network, node by node,
between generation, load, and load shedding, for real and reactive power, respectively.
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Constraints (3a) and (3b) ensure that real and reactive power flows for each phase are within
stated tolerances. A large difference in flow on a single line between two phases isn’t
desirable from an EE perspective. The βi j terms are tolerance parameters: the higher the
βi j value, the wider the tolerance between phases that is allowed.
Constraint (4) ensures the thermal limits of line (i, j) are not exceeded. These limits are
enforced only if a line is being used (i.e., xi j = 1). Constraint (4a) is a linear version to
allow each xi j to control whether flow is permitted on arc (i, j).
Constraints (5a) through (5f) account for flow losses across all possible phase combinations
on line (i j) due to resistance and reactance values for that line. Again, these constraints are
enforced only if a line is being used (i.e., xi j = 1).
Constraint (6) maintains voltage at node i within 95% to 105% of the nominal voltage for
that node, as mapped by its location from the nearest upstream transformer.
Constraints (7a), (7b), and (7c) ensure nodes only generate real and/or reactive power if
capable, as appropriate.
Constraints (8a) and (8b) only allow load to be shed at nodes with real or reactive load.
This prevents the formulation from spuriously shedding load at nodes without load, simply
to satisfy constraint mathematics.
Constraint (9) precludes cycles in the network by ensuring the number of active edges in
a cycle is one less than the number of edges in that cycle. This constraint is implemented
differently than the others. Initially, we solve the ACPF model without the cycle breaking
constraint active. Once a solution is obtained we analyze it to identify cycles within that
solution. For each cycle in the incumbent solution, a copy of constraint (9) is added and
then the ACPF model is solved again.
Constraint (10a) ensures there is flow in at most one direction (namely, on one arc) for a
given edge, and constraint (10b) ensures that edges without a switch are active in at least
one direction. If the switch on edge (i, j) is open, then both xi j and x ji will be zero.
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3.2 Model Implementation
The model is built in the Python programming language, an interpreted, high-level, general
purpose programming language (Python Software Foundation, 2017). The modular and
flexible nature of Python enabled us to integrate all computational tasks within a single pro-
gram. The data read and processing steps use several standard Python packages, including
json, numpy, and math packages, as well as networkx (Hagberg et al., 2008) for analysis.
The mathematical program is implemented in Pyomo, a “Python-based, open-source op-
timization modeling language with a diverse set of optimization capabilities” (Hart et al.,
2012, 2011).
Our test networks and the real life network are all in JavaScript Object Notation (JSON)
format (Ecma International, 2017), with three dictionaries in the data file, one for the nodes,
one for the edges in the network, and another for more detailed information on the nodes.
JSON, consisting of name and value pairs for its data storage is a natural fit for the Python
(and Pyomo) objects we use to construct the model.
After constructing all of the Python storage objects necessary for the model we have two
primary loops to prepare the data, one for the nodes and one for the edges. During these
loops we read in all of the requisite details for the distribution system. First, we read in node
details including attributes such as the type of node, e.g., substation, shunt capacitor, or
load, a unique node identification number, and specific data items such as dpi,k , dqi,k , gpui,k ,
v li,k , and more. Next, we read in data for the lines (i.e., edges) in the system. We capture the
Ri j,k and Xi j,k for lines, which nodes in the network a given line connects, and the number
of phases in a line. For lines that are transformers we capture the voltage difference across
the transformer and map these voltages through the network as Vnomi .
We store all data in Python dictionaries. Dictionaries are an ideal storage medium for the
network data because their structure uses key-value pairs and in this case we use the unique
node identification number to index node data, and the (tail, head) node identification pairs
for an edge to index edge data. Furthermore, Python dictionaries naturally integrate with the
Pyomo optimization package for forming Pyomo objects. For example, once a dictionary
is created with Ri j,k , it can be fed directly to the Pyomo resistance object.
Once the data is read in and prepared, we build the ACPF model in Pyomo and solve it with
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the CPLEX solver (IBM, 2017).
3.3 Model Testing
Webeginwith a basic test circuit that has no cycles or switches, aminor design simplification
to facilitate incremental model construction. A depiction of the basic test circuit appears in










The Basic Test Circuit consists of a substation with functionally infinite capacity,
a transformer, connective line leading to a service transformer, and a commer-
cial grade customer with moderate loading and a shunt capacitor bank. When
operated, no load should be shed in this test network.
Figure 3.1. Basic Test Circuit
3.4 Model Performance on Basic Test Circuit
The ACPF model, running on an early 2015 MacBook Pro with a 2.7 GHz i5 processor,
solves the basic test circuit in less than a second. The objective function (1) returns a result
of 0.00 corresponding to zero load shed, as anticipated. We observe pi j,k flows from the
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Table 3.1. Basic Test Circuit Node Data
Node Type gpui,k gq
u
i,k dpi,k dqi,k V
nom
i
(3,0) Substation ∞ ∞ 0 0 69
(3,5) Connection 0 0 0 0 7.62
(3,119) Connection 0 0 0 0 7.62
(3,139) Load, 0 400 57.55 (a) 29.29 (a) 0.277
Shunt 55.48 (b) 27.51 (b)
capacitor 60.65 (c) 30.78 (c)
Load for each phase (a-c) indicated explicitly
Table 3.2. Basic Test Circuit Edge Data
Edge Type Phases Ti j,k Ri j,k Xi j,k
(3,0),(3,5) Transformer a, b, c 120.773 0.0217 0.3548
(3,5),(3,119) Line a, b, c 498.75 0.1334 (a) 0.3124 (a)
0.1354 (b) 0.3053 (b)
0.1343 (c) 0.3089 (c)
(3,119),(3,139) Line a, b, c 32.808 0.0009 0.0053
Ri j,k and Xi j .k for each phase listed explicitly when variations exist.
substation to the load of 57.55, 55.48, and 60.65 Kw for phases a, b, and c, respectively, 
values matching the demands in node (3,139).
Due to the presence of a shunt capacitor bank on node (3,139) all reactive demand is
satisfied locally at the commercial customer, resulting in no qi j,k flow. Iterative testing,
namely removal of the shunt capacitor bank, causes qi j,k flow (in Kvar) satisfying all dqi,k .
This behavior confirms proper ACPF model operation regarding reactive power flow as
well.
At this point our ACPF model has performed as expected on the basic test circuit, success-
fully operating while adhering to power flow constraints (2a) through (8b).
3.5 Model Testing With Cycles
Once satisfied with operation on the basic test circuit we added switching controls and the
cycle breaking constraint (9) to complete implementation of the formulation in our ACPF
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model. At this point we build a basic test circuit with a cycle and switches for testing, as











The Basic Test Circuit With Cycle consists of a substation with functionally infinite
capacity and a moderate load, each with their own transformer. Between them is
a cycle of four nodes, with two of the four edges containing switches. Unlike the
Basic Test Circuit, there is no shunt capacitor at the load.
Figure 3.2. Basic Test Circuit with Cycle
Table 3.3. Basic Test Circuit with Cycle Node Data
Node Type gpui,k gq
u
i,k dpi,k dqi,k V
nom
i
Sub Substation ∞ ∞ 0 0 100
1 Connection 0 0 0 0 10
2 Connection 0 0 0 0 10
3 Connection 0 0 0 0 10
4 Connection 0 0 0 0 10
Load Load 0 0 30.0 20.0 1
Loading for each phase a - c is identical.
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Table 3.4. Basic Test Circuit with Cycle Edge Data
Edge Type Phases Ti j,k Ri j,k Xi j,k
Sub,1 Transformer a, b, c 100 0.0217 0.3548
1,2 Line a, b, c 100 0.1334 0.3124
1,3 Line a, b, c 100 0.1334 0.3124
2,4 Line a, b, c 100 0.1334 0.3053
3,4 Line a, b, c 100 0.1343 0.3089
4,Load Transformer a, b, c 100 0.0009 0.0053
Ri j,k and Xi j .k for each phase listed explicitly when variations exist.
The Basic Test Circuit with Cycle contains realistic Ri j and Xi j values, drawn from real
networks. Possessing a single load with its own service transformer and a substation with
functionally infinite gpi,k and gqi,k , the basic test circuit with cycle is electrically sound and
designed to shed no load when solved.
3.6 Model Performance on Basic Test Circuit with Cycle
Our model solves the basic test circuit with cycle initially, not enforcing the cycle breaking
constraint, resulting in the behavior summarized in Table 3.5.
Table 3.5. Basic Test Circuit with Cycle Results before Cycle Breaking
Constraint
Edge Type Switch / Position xi j pi j,k qi j,k
Sub,1 Transformer False, N/A 1 30.0 20.0
1,2 Line False, N/A 1 15.0 10.0
1,3 Line True, Closed 1 15.0 10.0
2,4 Line True, Closed 1 15.0 10.0
3,4 Line False, N/A 1 15.0 10.0
4,Load Transformer False, N/A 1 30.0 20.0
pi j,k and qi j,k flows the same for all phases.
20
At this point, we check the incumbent solution for cycles (using the networkx package)
and identify the cycle consisting of nodes 1, 2, 3, and 4. The cycle breaking constraint (9)
is enforced and the ACPF model runs again, this time producing a solution with no cycles
and zero load shed, as summarized in Table 3.6. Cycle breaking is restricted to opening a
switch on lines that have switches.
Table 3.6. Basic Test Circuit with Cycle Results after Cycle Breaking Con-
straint
Edge Type Switch / Position xi j pi j,k qi j,k
Sub,1 Transformer False, N/A 1 30.0 20.0
1,2 Line False, N/A 1 0.0 0.0
1,3 Line True, Closed 1 30.0 20.0
2,4 Line True, Open 0 0.0 0.0
3,4 Line False, N/A 1 30.0 20.0
4,Load Transformer False, N/A 1 30.0 20.0
pi j,k and qi j,k flows the same for all phases.
As can be observed, the cycle breaking constraint has forced the switch on line 2,4 to open.
Flow redirected to meet demand while avoiding a cycle being present in the network.
3.7 Model Validation
Having tested our ACPFmodel’s basic functions we test it against an IEEE RTS network for
validation. The IEEE RTS is a standardized test circuit whose behavior is well understood
by researchers and academia. Furthermore, phase changes, multiple branching paths, and
uneven loading make it a more robust test case than the basic test networks used thus far.
Observing proper behavior of the ACPF model on the RTS network serves as validation to
our modeling and these efforts are described in Chapter 4.
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4.1 IEEE RTS 13-bus feeder
We choose the IEEE RTS 13 node test feeder because it is relatively small and frequently
used to test analysis software (IEEE Power and Energy Society, 2017). Furthermore, the
network itself mimics real world distribution and is “characterized by being short, relatively
highly loaded, a single voltage regulator at the substation, overhead and underground lines,
shunt capacitors, an in-line transformer, and unbalanced loading” (IEEE Power and Energy
Society, 2017). A network with these characteristics will test many facets of our model
in a more robust capacity than the test networks in Chapter 3. The network is constructed
without the potential for cycles however, so our cycle breaking constraint is not exercised
when solving the IEEE RTS 13 node test feeder. The circuit is depicted in Figure 4.1.






Figure 4.1. IEEE 13 Node Test Feeder. The substation is at node 634 
with its transformer between node 634 and 633. A voltage regulator exists 
between node 632 and 650 but has no impact on network behavior within 
our model because node 650 is an unloaded bus.
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Full electrical characteristics for the 13 node test feeder can be found on the IEEE Power and 
Energy Society website (IEEE Power and Energy Society, 2017). The basic characteristics 
and those specifically pertinent to our ACPF model are described in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. 
Additionally, there is a distributed load in the IEEE 13 node test feeder along the line 
between nodes 632 and 671. We capture this load as an extra node named “dload,” existing 
equidistant between nodes 632 and 671. The distributed load node has dpi,k values of 10, 
38, and 68, with dqi,k values of 17, 66, and 117, all for phases a, b, and c, respectively.
Table 4.1. IEEE 13 Node Test Feeder Node Data
Node Type gpui,k gq
u
i,k dpi,k dqi,k V
nom
i
634 Substation, ∞ ∞ 160(a) 110(a) 115
Load 120(b,c) 90(b,c)
633 Connection 0 0 0 0 4.16
632 Connection 0 0 0 0 4.16
650 Connection 0 0 0 0 4.16
645 Load 0 0 170(b) 125(b) 4.16
646 Load 0 0 230(b) 132(b) 4.16
671 Load 0 0 385(a,b,c) 220(a,b,c) 4.16
684 Connection 0 0 0 0 4.16
652 Load 0 0 128(a) 86(a) 4.16
611 Load, 0 100(c) 170(c) 80(c) 4.16
Shunt
capacitor
680 Connection 0 0 0 0 4.16
692 Load 0 0 170(c) 151(c) 4.16




Load for each phase (a-c) indicated explicitly
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Table 4.2. IEEE 13 Node Test Feeder Edge Data
Edge Type Phases Ti j,k
634,633 Transformer a, b, c 1500
633,632 Line a, b, c 340
632,650 Line a, b, c 730
632,645 Line b, c 230
645,646 Line b, c 230
632,dload Line a, b, c 730
dload,671 Line a, b, c 730
671,684 Line a, c 230
684,611 Line c 230
684,652 Line a 165
671,680 Line a, b, c 730
671,692 Line a, b, c 1500
692,675 Line a, b, c 260
Ri j,k and Xi j .k for the network are 3 x 3 matrices. We refer our readers to the IEEE RTS
reference materials for specific values.
The network structure and parameters are built into the JSON format our associates at
LANL are using and which our model is built to read.
4.2 IEEE 13 Node Test Feeder Performance
The IEEE RTS 13 node test feeder runs in a little over a second and returns an optimal
solution objective function value of 0.00, a result our associates at LANL confirmed.
Electrical behavior is captured in Table 4.3.
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Table 4.3. IEEE 13 Node Test Feeder Edge Results
Edge Type xi j pi j,k qi j,k
634,633 Transformer 1 1015 (a) 381.91 (a)
919 (b) 515 (b)
1132 (c) 451 (c)
633,632 Line 1 1015 (a) 381.91 (a)
919 (b) 515 (b)
1132 (c) 451 (c)
632,650 Line 1 0.00 0.00
632,645 Line 1 400 (b) 257 (b)
645,646 Line 1 230 (b) 132 (b)
632,dload Line 1 1015 (a) 381.91 (a)
519 (b) 258 (b)
1132 (c) 451 (c)
dload,671 Line 1 998 (a) 371.91 (a)
453 (b) 220 (b)
1015 (c) 383 (c)
671,684 Line 1 128 (a) 86 (a)
170 (c) 0.00 (c)
684,611 Line 1 170 (c) 0.00 (c)
684,652 Line 1 128 (a) 86 (a)
671,680 Line 1 0.00 0.00
671,692 Line 1 485 (a) 115.11 (a)
68 (b) 21.33 (b)
460 (c) 197 (c)
692,675 Line 1 485 (a) 65.91 (a)
68 (b) 0.00 (b)
290 (c) 12 (c)
Our ACPF model demonstrates full functionality at this point, managing cycles, optimal
switching, and returning expected operational results on a standardized test circuit.
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Additionally, running theACPFmodel against variations in our test networks (e.g., removing
components, constraining electrical parameters, and varying loading amounts) produced
electrical results we would expect for these variations.
4.3 Expansion of IEEE 13 Node Test Feeder
Our model is ultimately about performing analysis on distribution systems under the stress
of disruption. With that in mind, we build an expanded version of the IEEE 13 node test
feeder, essentially cloning the network, with “a” and “b” versions of each node and line.
The two versions connect via a line from node 671a to 671b. This 3-phase line contains a
switch which is open under normal operating conditions. This expanded IEEE 13 node test
feeder is depicted in Figure 4.2
“a”	side	 “b”	side	
cross	connec.on	
The duplicated 13 node test feeder with “a” and “b” sides, connected by a line
between nodes 671a and 671b. Electrical parameters for both sides are the same
as the original IEEE 13 node test feeder, described in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. The
cross connection line is 3-phase with Ri j and Xi j values copied from line 692-675.
The Ti j value is very low at 15 amps.
Figure 4.2. Duplicated 13 Node Test Feeder
When given to our ACPF model the duplicated IEEE 13 node test feeder sheds no load,
an expected result since the single version met all load demands. In essence, we have
parallel instances of the previous test network and each one saw commensurate electrical
behavior, analogous to the results in Table 4.3 for both the “a” and “b” sides. Our next
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step is to consider model performance and distribution system behavior in the presence of
a disruption.
Our chosen disruption is failure of the “b” side substation, essentially removing it from the
network. Running the model with this disruption results in all “a” side load satisfied and the
cross connection switch to close. Including the cross-connection, only a handful of lines
on the “b” side have flow. Their values are captured in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4. Duplicated IEEE 13 Node Test Feeder Edge Results
Edge Type xi j pi j,k qi j,k
671a,671b Line 1 58.07 58.07
671b,dload_b Line 1 9.52 (a) 5.29 (a)
38.82 (b) 13.90 (b)
41.40 (c) 18.24 (c)
pi j,k and qi j,k flows the same for all phases unless explicitly listed.
Due to relatively low thermal limit we imposed on the 671a - 671b connection, most of the
“b” side goes without power and the model returns an objective function value of 4689.38.
We are not surprised by this amount of load shed given the parameters we assigned the
cross-connection.
4.4 Model Performance Overview
At this point the model has demonstrates the capability to analyze standardized test circuits
in the presence of network disruptions. Electrical parameters behave as expected and
operation of any distribution system can be optimized by the ACPF model in an effort to
minimize load shed. We provide recommendations for follow-on work and additional model
applications in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 5:
Conclusions and Follow-on Work
5.1 Conclusions
Working within a Python and Pyomo environment with CPLEX as a solver, our model
demonstrates the ability to find an optimal network configuration and associated power flow
for a 3-phase electrical distribution system. Our ACPF model can handle phase changes,
varying and imbalanced loads, real and reactive demand, switch operation, and ensures the
network is configured as a spanning tree to meet standard distribution system behavior.
The novelty in our work is due to the focus on distribution systems. The model receives
input from a JSON data structure used by the individuals at LANLworking on infrastructure
analysis. This allows for downstream use. Furthermore, the free and open-source nature of
the Python programming language makes our work easily accessible for additional research.
Alternating current is inherently non-linear. That said, the mathematics of the model are
linearized, with the exception of constraint (4) which is non-linear. Testing and experi-
mentation revealed that the non-linear structure of constraint (4) allowed for nonsensical
solutions when implemented independently. As such, we identified the need to build and
include constraint (4a). Doing so achieves correct results from the test networks and the
IEEE RTS 13 node test feeder.
5.2 Follow-on Work
Our associates at LANL have a detailed and highly comprehensive dataset from a real
northeastern utility provider. Our test networks and IEEE RTS 13 node test feeder are built
in the same JSON format as the real-world data, facilitating model application to the real
world data after some preliminary data cleaning.
The real-world dataset contains 52 substations, 73,304 loads, and several hundred thousand
nodes and arcs. There is interest in systematically triggering failure of substations and
capturing network behavior after the ACPF model runs. This analysis would yield data for
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subsequent vulnerability analysis as test and training sets. Furthermore, it would inform
us regarding distribution system behavior in the presence of substation failure, a topic of
interest to various government agencies.
To facilitate future work investigating the behavior of distribution systems in the presence of
adverse events, themodel should be augmented tomore easily disable part of the distribution
system being analyzed. At present, the data itself needs to be modified to break a line or
disable a substation. An update with the ability to pass in a component identification number
as a function argument for disruption purposes would greatly simplify this process.
Lastly, our ACPFmodel is built as a single Python function, allowing for easy incorporation
into AD and DAD analysis. Analysis of this nature would yield insight to the system
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